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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2012 United States Supreme Court case Arkansas Game & ish
Commission v. UnitedStates ("A G&FC') presented the Court with a claim that
the property of a landowner downstream of a flood control dam was taken
without compensation as a result of non-permanent inundations of low lying
portions of that parcel caused by achange in the dam's pattern of releases.' The
Court held that, "government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no
automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection" and must, instead, be
tested according to the Court's usual precedents governing temporary physical
invasions and regulatory takings.! The Federal Circuit held a taking had
occurred on remand, the scope of which was limited because the United States
waived several key issues. In doing so, the Federal Circuit utilized language that
understates the limitations on takings recoveries in such cases. Both the result
and the remand opinion will encourage downstream landowners, suffering
inundation losses traceable to flood control dam operations, to bring takings
claims.
The AG&FClitigation comes at a time when flood control dam operations
are becoming ever more prominent. Recent national events attest to more
extreme weather in the form of droughts and intense precipitation events. Dan
operators, whose physical facilities were designed with reference to less extreme
conditions, must adjust their operations to allow their dams to continue to
function to provide optimal protection against massive flood damage. When
those adjustments require increased or altered releases in comparison to past
norms, those releases inevitably will lead to increases of inundation below the
dam, raising the possibility that in some instances, the increased inundation may

1. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. CL 511 (2012).
2. Id. at 522.
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cause significant harm for which the landowner will seek compensation.
This Article analyzes the possible bases on which compensation can be
granted. Congress, for the present, has eliminated the possibility of tort liability
by granting federal flood control darn operators with blanket tort immunity.
While the AG&FC decision bespeaks the possibility of Fifth Amendment
taking of property liability, this Article argues that under takings standards,
takings compensation rarely will be available to adversely affected landowners.
Under long and unquestioned precedent, takings liability, rather than tort
liability, attaches only when the downstream inundations are a deliberately
planned aspect of the darn's operation, in the same way that a storage pool
reservoir is part of the darn's intended pattern of operation.
Even when releases are deliberately planned, very few adversely affected
downstream landowners are likely to suffer a harm so disproportionate as to
permit them to make a prima facie case of a taking vel non as required by the
Court in AG&fi
Three separate lines of analysis make a taking of property
unlikely: (1) in few, if any, jurisdictions will the state law definition of riparian
rights include the right to be free of all inundations caused by actions of coriparians; (2) the modern takings test elucidated in the Penn Centralcasecannot
be satisfied, and; (3) the situation will be governed by the nuisance prevention
line of cases in which governmental actions that prevent substantial harms to
the public are not takings. In all of these contexts, the importance of the flood
control is a factor in the determination that means most cases of temporary
inundation either will not violate the property right or will not be found to be a
taking of that right.
Without compensation, a clear possibility exists that some adversely
affected landowners will suffer unfairly-they sustain harm that is
disproportionate to that of others, and their share in the flood mitigation benefit
is no more than similar to that of others. In the face of governmental tort
immunity and the slim hope for a takings claim to succeed, this Article argues
in favor of the voluntary creation of a compensation system. While this can be
done by before-the-fact condemnation, Congress has seldom required such
action in the absence of planned zones of sacrifice as an element in a
congressionally authorized program. Congress also may act after the fact
through special legislation, or disaster relief, but those remedies are potentially
quixotic rather than systemic.
Landowners can purchase private flood
insurance, which tends to be very costly, but there is little evidence that
landowners purchase either private or subsidized flood insurance. This Article
instead recommends creation of flood control districts that establish
compensation funds, financed by a tax on lands benefitted by the presence and
operation of the flood control dam, which greatly limits the risk of major losses
to all such lands. Additionally, Congress should reduce the scope of the
governmental tort immunity by excluding cases of gross negligence from the
immunity, thereby striking a better balance between flood control dam operator
freedom to respond to changing and exigent circumstances and doing so in
wanton disregard of a given action's resulting harms.
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11. THE PROBLEM OF DOWNSTREAM INUNDATIONS CAUSED BY FLOOD
CONTROL DAM OPERATIONS

Flood control dams operate with a beguiling simplicity-build a dam and
then close the gates to fill the reservoir when excessive amounts of water are
flowing downstream; open the gates to empty the reservoir at times when lesser
amounts of water are flowing downstream. Ecologically both ends of the flow
alteration spectrum are, to some degree, problematic. Dans interdict the
natural flow and alter the river's hydrograph. Dams limit or eliminate scouring
heavy flows that move silt downstream and keep channels clear allowing greater
volumes of water to move downstream more quickly without flooding. At the
same time, some downstream flooding is part of the pre-dam natural cycle that
provides nutrients to flooded areas and creates riparian habitat, to which the
area's species and ecology adapted over the eons. Dans' presence modifies the
habitat in a myriad of ways, for instance, interfering with fish passage and
Dam discharges also change the flow's
destroying spawning regions.
characteristics, such as temperature and oxygen content. They also may add
high concentrations of pollutants from sediments that have collected at the
bottom of the dan's pool, which are roiled and re-suspended during periods of
release.
In the face of these generally negative ecological consequences, the
retention of water is justified by harm prevention that accompanies a vast
reduction of downstream flooding during high flow periods. The flood risk
reduction is often accompanied by collateral benefits such as hydropower
generation, flat-water recreation, navigation improvements, and public water
supply security in the form of storage that can hedge against drought. The
effects of water intentionally released from flood control dams are
comparatively minor when all the other benefits and costs are totaled up, and
easily recede to being a tertiary concern, if considered at all. Part of the lack of
concern for human values affected by post-dam releases has a logical
explanation. Those releases flow into the same channel that had previously
seen comparatively little developmental activity precisely because the low-lying
lands were flood-prone in pre-dam times.
Somewhat ironically, the overall success of flood control dams to prevent
and mitigate downstream flooding has encouraged ever more intensive use of
what was previously the riveine flood plain. As a result, the lack of focus on
flood control dam releases is ending. Once built, the dam's operations create
an umbrella of comparative safety in which downstream development
encroaches on the flood plain, relying on protection against major floods and
being confident that releases of stored water will be planned in a manner
intended to minimize interference with downstream owners. The dam and its
operations become a "new normal," pursuant to which downstream homes,
businesses, and other land use patterns in the former flood plain of the river
below the dam now may be in harm's way if the pattern of releases changes
What scientists describe as the "loss of stationarity" makes it certain that

3. Adding to the irony, these new and expanded human activities in tie traditional flood
plain increase the current risk of flood damnage due to a hardened landscape, which increases the
mnount of nnoff during rainfall events and channels it into the wvaterways more suddenly.
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many flood control dams will change their patterns of releases. Stationarity is
the concept that weather varies within a predictable range of extremes. For
water infrastructure planners, that historic experience guided the design and
management of facility construction and subsequent darn operations. Increased
variability of weather patterns has undermined the stationarity assumption of
predictable norms.' Ifthe assumptions on which those operational choices were
built are no longer valid, it is patent that changes in operations are needed to
meet the new reality.5 Put most simply, climate change necessitates altered
release patterns. It is axiomatic that a flood control dam operator must "empty"
the reservoir, so it has space in which to store the next heavy water flow event.
The advent of more frequent intense precipitation events6 means that the
prudent flood control darn operator, at times, will need to release stored waters
more quickly than in an environment that featured less frequent intense rainfall
events.7 When tie darn operator increases the rapidity of the releases,
downstrean riparian owners will have higher volumes of water flowing past their
tracts, which necessarily means that the watercourse will inundate additional
portions of their land. If that inundation interferes with productive activity, the
landowner will suffer a loss, complain, and bring dam releases under scrutiny.
Climate variability is not the only impetus to change release patterns;
human factors may come into play as well. In the AG&FC litigation, which
serves as a focus for this Article, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") was asked to reduce the adverse inundation effects of its historic
pattern of releases, on low-lying farms by making releases more gradual, which
would provide those farms a longer growing season. That change, in turn,
caused danage far downstrean. The physical hydrologic lesson of that case is
simple: changes in a dam's release pattern cause water to move downstream at
altered times and in altered anounts, which can cause physical impacts to
downstream, streamside property not previously experienced. Thinking about
the streamnbed as anr open conduit having, in many places, little or no freeboard,
any increase in a release adds water that will encroach on low-lying riparian
lands adjacent to the watercourse that had otherwise remained dry under the
prior release pattern. Whether driven by climate change or human factors,
changes in flood control darn operations hold the possibility of inundationcaused injury to properties situated downstream of the dant.
A. GIVING THE PROBLEM LEGAL VISIBILITY: THE AG&FCLITIGATION
The AG&F litigation, perhaps because it was not prompted by concern
linked to loss of staionarity, came into the judicial system in a sympathetic
4. Sce P. C. D. Milly etal., Staionariy i5 Dead: Whither Water Managcment?, ScI.
1,2008, at 573.

MAGAZINE, Feb.

5. Sec discussion in/ia Part II.B (describing die reasons why and how dam operations might
be altered).
6. National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program: Heavy Downpours Increasing, http://nca2014.globdchange.gov/report/our-changing-climate/heavy-downpour
s-increasing.
7. A dam operator might also lind it prudent to maintain the pool at a lower level. Lowering
the usual level of the pool may adversely affect other interests that a dam might serve, such as
hydropower generation mid storage for water supply.
8. See discussion in/ra Part III.A.2.
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posture. After almost a half-century of experience operating the Clearwater
Dam on the Black River in Missouri in one manner, the Corps adopted an
eight-year series of temporary release pattern changes beginning in 1993. The
Corps made changes in response to a request by farners below the dan' who
would obtain longer cultivation periods when their low-lying farmlands were not
inundated. The Corps altered its longstanding release pattern," but the decision
to provide that marginal farming benefit was flawed, or at least incomplete in its
It (lid not foresee potentially serious adverse
assessment of impacts.
consequences to a valued ecological resource, one of the region's few remaining
bottomland hardwood forests, and plainly did not intend to sacrifice the
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission's ("Commission") property as the means
of obtaining other benefits."
The Corps did not foresee that the forest, located in the Dave Donaldson
Black River Wildlife Management Area ("Management Area") in Arkansas,
115-miles downstream from the Clearwater Dam, would be seriously affected.
Within the first year of the changed release pattern, however, the Commission,
which owns the lands and oversees the Management Area, alerted the Corps to
the increased flooding of their bottomlands." Prior to the change in the Corps'
dam operations, the forested area of the Commission regularly flooded, but that
flooding almost always receded while the trees were dormant and before their
summer growing season." In effect, the new pattern, if continued long enough,
threatened to drown the trees, because during the growing season the roots
would be unable to absorb nutrients and oxygen necessary for photosynthesis."
The Commission gave the Corps warning at a time when the permanent damage
to the forest could have been avoided. Initially, and for a period of years, the
Corps did not agree that its change in operations was the cause of the longer
period of distant downstream inundation. Quite late in the process, the Corps
9. In its initial opinion in the case, tie Federal Circuit recounts iechronology of events in
detail. Sec Ark. Gamc & Fish Comm'n v.United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1369-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
rev'd133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
10. Id.
11. A particularly succinct statement of what the Corps (lid and why it caused an adverse
effect on the Commission appears in Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court:
In 1993, the Corps approved a planned deviation in response to requests from farmers.
From September to December 1993, the Corps released water from the Darn ata
slower rate than usual, providing downstream farmers with a longer harvest time. As a

result, more water than usual accumulated in Clearwater Lake behind the Dam. To
reduce the accumulation, the Corps extended the period in which a high amount of

water would be released.

The IAG&FCI Commission maintained this extension

yielded downstream flooding in the Management Area, above historical norms, during
the tree-growing season, which runs from April to October. If the Corps had released
the water more rapidly in the fall of 1993, in accordance with the Manual and with past
practice, there would have been short-term waves of flooding which would have
receded quickly. The lower rate of release in the fall, however, extended the period of
flooding well into the following spring and summer. Vhile the deviation benefited
farmers, it interfered with the Management Area's tree-growing season.
Ark. Game & Fish Colninn,

133 S. CL at 516.

12. Sec id.
13. See id.
14. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 632 (2009) (citing
testimony from the Commission's expert, Dr. James Baker).
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recognized that its altered release pattern could be capable of negatively
affecting the forest at, what was for the trees, a critical time of the year."
With the advantage of hindsight and knowledge of the consequences, the
Corps' unfortunate choice stands out in high relief. The marginal fanning gains,
which appear to be the only benefits of the change,'6 are not an important or
substantial flood control benefit. More importantly, the benefit garnlered by
reduced periods of farr inundation compares unequally to the forest loss."
The loss is made worse because the Corps, for a time, seemed to turn a deaf
ear on the calls from the Commission imploring de Corps to revert to its past
release pattern. Then, once the Corps more fully engaged the issue and
reinstituted the prior release pattern, it was too late to save the portion of the
forest that had succumbed to flood stresses.
The Commission's loss was substantial-it included eighteen million boardfeet of hardwood lumber, which together with the cost of reclaiming the flooded
area, eventually led the Court of Federal Claims to award in excess of $5.6
million dollars.' Together, those facts paint a picture of the Corps as unable to
measure the consequences of its actions, insensitive to the impacts of its actions,
or both.'9

1. The Course of Litigation Prior to Reaching the United States Supreme
Court
In 1928, before any of the flood control dams in the Mississippi-Missouri
Basin were built, Congress granted federal darn operators statutory tort
immunity for the operation of flood control dans"-meaning the Commission
had to overcome the presumption that it could not sue the Corps for negligence.
Unable to pursue a tort remedy, the Commission instead sought relief by
claiming that the series of longer inundation periods constituted a physical
15. Despite conceding its role in the changed pattern of inundation, the Corps never idly
conceded its actions were the sole cause of the loss of the hardwoods. Vcc United States' Post-

Trial Memorandum at 9, Ark. Game & Pish Comr'n,87 Fed. CI. at 623 (No. 05-381L). The
Corps maintained that a multi-year period of summer drought was responsible for weakening the
trees so much that they could not recover once the previous regime of dam releases was
reestablished and the root zone was clear of water during the growing season. The Court of
Federal Claims found against the Corps on this factual issue in a ruling that was sustained on
appeal. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
2013) a/l'g Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 633-34. The issues the Corps may have
raised with regard to intervening causes were not properly preserved for appeal.
16. A review of the litigation materials available online raise no other reason for the change.
17. This author could lind no record in the materials relating to the case that quantified the
fanning benelit
18. Ark. Game & Fish Cb'mm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 647 (awarding, in addition, more than
$100,000 for a regeneration program and interest on those amounts).
19. It is tempting to pillory the Corps for its inaction and failure to promptly restore the old
release plan. The Corps, however, had taken steps to obtain input from an array of stakeholders
potentially affected hy the releases, establishing two ad hoc commissions. Those commissions
assisted the Corps for almost eight years, but for the most part (lid not reach consensus on a
changed long-term operating plan. AG&FC was a participant in that process. See Ark. Game &
Fish Comi'n, 133 S.CL- at 513, 516. What remains less clear is why the Corps' own technical
assessments of the situation were so slow to model more accurately the effects of the chaniged
releases on the Donaldson Management Area.
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2015) (originally enacted as Act of May 15, 1928, ch. 569, § 3, 4.5

Star.534, 535-36.)
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invasion of its land, amounting to a Fifth Amendment taking of property without
compensation."
The Court of Federal Claims ruled, in essence, that the Corps had taken a
property interest in the form of a temporary flowage easement in the
Management Area because the changes in the flow regime caused "intermittent,
frequent, and inevitably recurring" flooding that resulted in the destruction of a
significant amount of timber." The court further found that because the
flooding and subsequent damage to the timber were foreseeable consequences
of the changes in the flow regime, the Corps' actions amounted to a permanent
taking. '
The Corps defended on both the facts and the law. As a factual matter, the
Corps relied on a computer model demonstrating that the deviations in the flow
regime alone were not sufficient to result in substantial changes in the
Management Area's flood pattern, but that "natural rainfall and runoff, plus the
timing of the water levels" may result in greater periods of inundation.4 In
addition, the Corps asserted that its actions were not the sole cause of the loss
of the hardwoods. The Corps maintained that the summer droughts in 1999
and 2000, were "naturally occurring intervening eventsl... that caused the
massive, the devastating mortality" of the hardwoods.' The Corps' arguments
did not persuade the Court of Federal Claims, which found that the Corps'
deviations from the long-followed release pattern were responsible for the
Management Area's increased flooding and resulted in the timber destruction
in the Management Area from 1993 through 2000.6
The Corps' legal argument was narrow. The Corps argued that only
permanent physical invasions, as opposed to a temporary inundation, could be
a taking of property under the relevant Supreme Court precedents.
In
particular, the Corps relied on Sanguinettiv. United States." In Lnguineti, the
Supreme Court found that temporary, increased flooding of private land was
not a taking when that land had periodically flooded prior to the construction
of a canal.' The Corps contended the case was on all fours with Sanguinett:
prior to and subsequent to the dam construction the Management Area was
subjected to flooding; the flow deviations, which had caused the increased

21.
22.
23.
24.
Game

Ark. Gamc& Frih Comin'n, 87 Fed. C1. at 616.
Id.at 618-19 (citing Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d 1192, 1196 (Ct. CI. 1969)).
See id.
at 624.
Id.at 608-09, 627-29; Principal Brief of Defendant-Appellant United States at 12, Ark.
& Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 05-CV-381), at 12.

25. Ark. Fish & Game Commn, 87 Fed. Cl. at 623 (citing Dr. Baker's testimony and arguing
the summer droughts in 1999 to 2000 were intervening causes that broke "the link between tie
increased flooding probability and the damage to the trees).
26. Id.at 634; Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364,1371-72 (holding
that the evidence supported the trial court's findings that the deviations caused a substantial
increase in the periods of growing-season flooding and that the flooding caused widespread
damage to the trees there).

27. See Principal Brief of Defendant-Appellant United States, supra note 25, at 15.
28. Id.at 20.

29. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1924) (finding "Jilt is at least
necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual,
pennanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an injury to
the property.").
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inundation periods had ceased, thus its actions did not amount to a taking.3'
The Court of Federal Claims rejected this argument saying:
JAI plaintiff need not show that its property "sufferIedl an effectual
destruction or a pemnanent and exclusive occupation by government runoW' to
recover on a takings claim based on a flowage easement. Rather, recovery based
on a goverunent's taking would be permitted even if the landowner eventually
was able to reclaim his land or the intrusions of water were halted...
Accordingly, the Commission has met its burden of proving that the Corps'
releases were "intermittent, frequent, and inevitably recurring lloodings" that
a taking, rather than "'isolated invasions"' that might merely constitute
support
3
a tort. '
The United States Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, by a 2-1 vote,
reversed the finding of a taking.12 The Federal Circuit majority ruling was very
narrow, relying on a preemptive legal ground: inundations of property
downstream of a flood control dan could be a taking of property only if"that
flooding was permanent or intended to be continually repeated. " In support of
its bright-line test, the Federal Circuit built its own argument based on
3 which the court construed as having established a special rule for
Sanguinett4
flooding cases to the effect that non-permanent downstream inundation caused
by Corps' dam operations could not be a taking of property.' Because the
Corps deemed the changes in the AG&FCcase as interim operating rules, and
thus temporary, and the eventual reinstatement of the old regime ceased the
extended periods of flooding, the court fbund there could be no taking of
property."
2. The AG&FCLitigation in the United States Supreme Court and on
Remand
The United States Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve the
question whether government actions that cause repeated floodings must be
permanent or inevitably recurring to constitute a taking of property."" The
Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit's interpretation of Sanguineui and
reversed the Federal Circuit, stating, "We rule today, simply and only, that
government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic
exemption from Takings Clause inspection." Despite the narrow holding, the
Court's opinion was replete with dicta offering guidance for remand relating to
how its takings precedents help identify which issues to consider in cases
claiming takings as a result of less than permanent flood control operations.'
30.

Principal Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 25, at 29-30.

31. Ark. Fish & Gamc Comm'n, 87 Fed. C1. at. 618-19 (citing Ridge Line, Inc. v. tJnited
States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1353, 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d
1192,1196 (Ct. CI. 1969)).
32. Ark Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
33. Id. at 1378.
34. Sanguineli, 264 U.S. at 146.
35. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 637 F.3d at 1374.
36. Id.
37. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 133 S.Ct. at 518.
38. Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
39.

133 S. Ct. at 522-23.
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One of those issues "is the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the
foreseeable result of authorized government action."' The Cour's remand also
identified issues of fact finding and underlying state property law, which, if
properly preserved for review, were issues the Federal Circuit should consider
on remand for a proper Fifth Amendment takings analysis.'
In late 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its ruling
on remand, and affirmed the original Court of Federal Claims decision that
2
The Federal Circuit found that,
found a taking of the Commission's property."
due to the Corps failure to raise them in the Court of Federal Claims, several
of the key issues identified by the Supreme Court as relevant for a takings
analysis were not preserved for review." The issues foreclosed included the
nature of the state law property rights the Commission claimed were taken and
the extent to which those rights support the Commission's reasonable
investment-backed expectations to be free of changed inundation patterns
through government action.' Those two issues are intertwined because an
important element of investment-backed expectations is the underlying state
water law, which in the AG&FC setting is Arkansas' law of reasonable use
riparianism.
The Corps also failed to raise the applicability of the nuisance prevention
doctrine to its operation of flood control dams, which often functions in a
manner similar to an affirmative defense to takings claims. Otherwise
actionable takings claims fail because the govemmental regulation or action
protects the public against a nuisance, or in some other manner forestalls harm
to the public by burdening the landowner's parcel. Within the nuisance
prevention cases, there is a subcategory in which government regulation of
landowners, or actions taken to protect against hamis that burden landowners,
impose a cost on one or more of the landowners to prevent more serious injury
As a terminological matter, these cases will be
to the common welfare."
referred to as the triage subcategory of the nuisance prevention doctrine cases.
The leading case in the triage subcategory is Miller v. Schoene, in which the
Supreme Court refused to find a taking of property when the government
required landowners to destroy their own property at their own expense in
order to avert a public harm, which appeared likely to occur if the private
property of the regulated owners was not destroyed.' As discussed more fully
later in this Article, the nuisance prevention line of cases, when applied,
significantly narrows the scope of what sorts of downstream adverse effects are
40. Id. at522 (citingJohn HorsUnann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 146 (1921) (finding
no takings liability when damage caused by government action could not have been foreseen)).
41. 133 S. CL at 522-23.
42. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 736 F.3d at 1367; Ark. Game & Fish Comm', 87 Fed. C.
at 647.
43. 736 F.3d at 1369
44. See id.
45. Id. at 1375.
46. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. CL 511,522 (2012); See, e.g., Harris
v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955).
47. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1928); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
590-91 (1962); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992).
48. Miller,276 U.S. at 278-79; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
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takings of property under the Fifth Amendment. "
The Federal Circuit finding of a taking on remand adopted broad language
that tended to obscure the absence of issues not preserved due to the Corps'
litigation strategy that might have averted a successful takings claim. As written,
the Federal Circuit opinion suggests that an inundation claimant can recover for
a taking of property by proving only an objective and foreseeable harm due to
increased flooding' linked to a pattern of releases that confers a benefit of lesser
flooding on others situated below a dam5' The Federal Circuit's use of
foreseeability badly misstates the rules laid down by the precedents upon which
it relied5'
The apparent breadth of the AG&FC remand ruling will encourage
litigation by downstream landowners adversely affected by flood control dan
releases or changes in past patterns of releases (unless those releases are very
infrequent or a response to an exigent problem).5 Moreover, as will be argued
at length in this Article," the Court of Claims AG&FCresult, as now affirued
by the Federal Circuit, transmutes flooding case takings law into a deterinination
that closely tracks the elements of tort recovery. If not corrected, that reading
of takings law has the potential to make the Federal Treasury the insurer of an
extensive array of downstream losses caused by federal dam operations. The
tort-like reasoning that led to the eventual result favoring the Commission is just
that, a governmental tort. While in some cases governmental actions that
constitute torts also are takings of property under the Constitution, not all
tortious actions violate the Fifth Amendment.' Accepting the "tort-as-taking"
substituti on usurps Congress' clear power and intent when it immunized federal
flood control darn operators from tort liability. A finer grained takings analysis
must be utilized.
B. GENERALIZING THE PROBLEM: CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL PARADIGM
FOR OPERATING FLOOD CONTROL DAMS FAIRLY

Taking on the perspective of a flood control dam operator, for a moment,
the loss of stationarity greatly complicates dam operations and demands
reconsideration of past operating decisions." The loss of stationarity implies
that prudent operational planning must consider the potential for more intense
flood events and more prolonged or intense droughts." Focusing on floods
alone, flood control potential is maximized when the reservoir level is kept as
low as possible leaving room to impound potential flood waters and release

49. See discussion infra Part III.D.
50. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'nn, 736 F.3d at 1373, n.3.
51. Id. at 1374, n.4.
52. See discussion infra Part III.A.I.
53. See,e.g., Complaint at 4-5, Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-183L 2015 WL
2330302 (Fed. CI. Mar. 5, 2014).
54. See discussion infta Part III.A.
55. Drury v. United States Dept. of Army, 902 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. La. 1995) (citing
Golden Pacific Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
56. See P. C. D. Milly et al., Stationanty is Dead: WVhither Water Management?, ScI.
MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 2008, at 573-74
57. Id.

WA TER IA WREVIEW

Volume 19

them after the period of excessive runoff and flow has ended. 8 Two elements
in that scenario auger in favor of releasing stored water at higher than historical
rates. First, if the dam operator expects precipitation events to be more intense
than previously, more water will need to be released and that will require higher
rates to accomplish the release in the same period of time. Second, the loss of
stationarity increases the potential for more storms following on the heels of
their predecessor, making it important to release water more rapidly as a form
of preparation for a potential next storm. If the rates of release increase,
downstream inundation increases in comparison to the previous experience. 9
The dam operator has control over the pattern of releases, but the larger strategy
and the mitigated risk, is being dictated by the patterns of precipitation and
drought. Not all dam operators will have to change operations to include more
rapid releases in response to the loss of stationarity, but some will and that
response, at a societal level, is a good and logical one. When those changes are
made, there will be more cases like A G&FCwhen the altered release patterns
cause losses occasioned by new downstream inundations. AG&FChas opened
the door to takings claims in those cases. Despite the sympathetic posture of
the AG&FCfacts, the remainder of this Article explores the reasons why there
should be very few takings recoveries for flood control dam releases that cause
injuries.
At a very pragmatic level, the concern ought to be about fair treatment and
equitable sharing of the benefits and burdens of flood control efforts. Despite
the burdens on downstream riparians that may accompany releases of stored
water in excess of either the native flow of the river or dam-altered historic
patterns of releases, their situation brings to mind a waste disposal quip,
"Everyone wants us to pick it [refuse] up but nobody wants us to put it down.""0
All the landowners below the dam are very happy to have the benefits of the
dam's protection against major flooding, but none of those owners want the
stored excess waters released in a manner that causes them to suffer even
temporary, partial inundations that adversely affect what has become the pattern
of full enjoyment of their parcels as protected by the dam's flood-control
capability. When downstream landowners experience losses that are mainly on
par with one another, or not too severe, they benefit from the protection against
more extreme flooding. All landowners are at risk of small or similar losses due
to temporary inundations associated with the release of the stored water.
When, however, a few of the downstream landowners suffer more substantial

58. See Hlood Control Structures:Addressing Climate Change Impacts on Infiastncture,
Fact Sheet, U.S. AID, Nov. 2012, at 1-2.
59. For dams that have the ability to do double service relating to both flood control and
water supply, meeting operational goals for flood prevention storage capacity and drought
mitigation water supply are in tension with one another. On the flood prevention side, the basic
strategy is to keep the reservoir as empty as possible, in order to store more water during an
extreme precipitation event. On the waler supply side, the basic strategy is to keep the reservoir
as full as possible, to have the greatest amount in storage to be released as needed to combat the
effects of drought. Melding those two strategies, the dam operator would auempt to keep the pool
as full as possible, but only so full that it can be rapidly lowered by releases when an intense
potentially flood producing rainfall event is predicted.
60. See Ronald D. Kinsey, FerrousMetals - Recovery andReuse, WAIER, AIR, AND Soi.
POLLuTION, May 1975, at 167, availableat http://www.link.springer.com/content/pdf/l 0.1007%
2FBF00160442.pdf.
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losses, disproportionate to those of the other downstream landowners, in the
absence of compensation, the result no longer seems fair. The next sections of
this Article will demonstrate that redress of disproportionate losses will seldom
be available under current law, and the aspect of current law that prevents
landowners from compensation for those claimed takings of property is
appropriate. Finally, this Article will suggest two alternatives to takings claims
as means of providing redress for disproportionate losses, a slight relaxation of
governmental tort immunity, and more broadly, the establishment of flood
control districts that lay taxes on all benefitted parcels to create a fund from
which disproportionately affected landowners get compensation.
Il.

THE DIFFICULTY OF ESTABLISHING A TAKING vEL NON BASED ON
TEMPORARY INUNDATION OF THE CLAIMANTS PROPERTY

As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court decision in Ark.
Game & lis5h Commnis.sion v. United Slates ruled very narrowly on the Fifth
Amendment taking of property issue." Along with its holding that a nonpermanent inundation of a portion of the Commission's lands can be a taking
in limited circumstances, the Court added dicta to serve as guidance on remand
and in similar future cases." That dicta began in the very next sentence after
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, " announced the succinct and
narrow reversal of the Federal Circuit's decision below:
We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding temporary
in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection.
When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes
with private property, our decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in
determining the existence ve!non of a compensable taking."
A claimant has several burdens when establishing a taking vel non. ' As
indicated in the language set out above, the Court expressly pointed out that
flooding duration was a factor.' The Court went on to mention three other
aspects that figure in the takings analysis: (i) "the degree to which the invasion is
intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action;" (ii) the
character of the land and the claimant's Investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the severity of property interference." The Court also pointed out that there
were a number of issues it neither reached nor reviewed because of the case
posture, and noted that on remand, if they had been properly preserved, the
Federal Circuit could consider those issues." These issues included a possible
61.

Ark. Gamne & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012).

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

1d.at 522-23.
Id (Kagan, J., absent).
.at 522.
Ark. Game & Fish Comrn'n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 614-15 (2009).
Ark. Game & Fsh Comm'n, 133 S. C1. at 522. Presumably, die shorter the duration, the

less likely the action is to eflect a taking. The duration, so long as it is not permanent, is not a
key factor in the lines of analysis presented in this Article. None of the arguments against a taking
rely on short-term imposions against the landowner. Ise concern for unfairness to landowners
would be no less if a substantial and disproportionate loss occurred over a short period of time.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 522-23.
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legal distinction between upstream and downstream inundation, the nature of
the underlying property right, and a number of factual findings."9
When the Court's opinion is removed from its case specific context, the
methodology for future litigants to follow in downstream flooding takings cases
can be broken down into a series of, more or less, sequential steps:
1.

Determining that the case is within the scope of the waiver of
governmental immunity that authorizes it to be heard by the Court
of Federal Claims, a determination that turns on analysis of whether
the case falls on the takings side of the tort-takings dividing line;

2.

Determining the state law content of the property right that is claimed
to be taken and on that basis applying the typical regulatory takings
tests announced by Penn Central7 and other cases; and

3.

Assessing whether the governmental action qualifies as either
nuisance prevention or action taken to prevent great public harm.'

To recover for a taking of property, the claimant must prevail on all three
inquiries or else a court will not find a taking. These topics are considered in
turn and all of them are difficult for a claimant to establish-even a claimant who
suffers a substantial and disproportionate loss.
A. CROSSING THE TORT IMMUNITY-TAKINGS CLAIM DIVIDE
While the Federal Circuit addressed on remand foreseeability, a review of
the cases demonstrates that the underlying issue is quasi-jurisdictional and relies
on a foreseeability analysis that is not co-extensive with typical tort law concepts.
In cases like A G&FC,a claimant suing the federal government for a taking must
first establish that the case is properly within the "purview" of the Court of
Federal Claims." The term "purview" is evolving to describe the nether region
between the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and the
merits of cases lodged there." This is a fon of jurisdiction-to-determinejurisdiction. The court must exanine the facts surrounding the claim to
determine whether the claim is within the limited waiver of sovereign immunity
that defines the authority and jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to
grant relief under the Tucker Act." The relevant statutory language permits the
Court of Federal Claims to hear cases "against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. In such

69. Id. at521-22.
70. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-125 (1978).
71. Sec discussion infra Part III.D.
72. Sec Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v.United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594, 614, n.15 (2009).
73. See discussion inia Part III.A.I and note 77.
74. See, e.g., Ark Game & Fsh Conm'n, 87 Fed. C1. at 615, nn.16-17
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011). In the flood control area, in addition to the Tucker Act
limitation on tort recoveries, there also is an express tort immunity statute. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c
(2015).
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cases, the court's dismissal of non-frivolous claims that fall on the tort side of
the tort-taking dichotomy are treated as dismissals for failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, rather than dismissals due to a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 6 Making the jurisdictional showing requires the claimant to locate
the case as falling on the taking side of the divide between attempted recoveries
that sound in tort and those based on takings liability, which is a showing that
emphasizes a specialized form of foreseeability."
1. The Degree of Foreseeability and Intentionality Required to Avoid
Immunity and the Overbroad Reading of Precedents by the Federal Circuit
on Remand
On remand, the Federal Circuit limited its opinion to tie issues the parties
preserved that had been raised in the initial appeal from the Court of Federal
Claims. 6 The court then further subdivided its review of the takings questions
(as opposed to some evidentiary questions it had declined to reach on the
original appeal) into live separate categories, one of which it terms
"Foreseeability. ' 9 The past precedents the Federal Circuit cited make it quite
clear that what tie Federal Circuit termed the "Foreseeability" issue is actually
the litnmus tort-takings test for avoiding immunity and invoking its subject matter
jurisdiction. In that regard, the Federal Circuit relied on its earlier decision in
Moden v. United States to explicate the standard it applied.' Moden involved
landowners' appeal from a subject matter jurisdiction dismissal of a claim that
the TCE contamination of their property, arguably traceable to improper use
of that solvent at the neighboring air force base, took their property in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.' In Moden, tie Federal Circuit stated:
The government contends that Ito be within the Court of Federal Claims
jurisdictionl the resulting injury must be foreseeable from the authorized
government act, whereas the Modens' and amiicus curiae, Defenders of
Property Rights, contend that the authorized government act need only be the

"cause-in-fact" of the resulting injury. Simplified somewhat, the government's
interpretation requires that die injury was the likely result of the act, whereas
the Modens' interpretation requires only that the act was the likely cause of
the injury. The government's interpretation finds support in the language of
the standard, which refers to a "direct, natural, or probable result," not a direct,
natural, or probable cause. The government's interpretation also finds support
in our case law. In IR6ige Line Inc. v. United Statesl, we stated that the court
must determine whether the alleged injury was the "predictable result of the
government action." This Ridge Line interpretation itself finds support in a

76. See, e.g., Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 679, 687-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,216 (1983) (reasoning that if a claim falls within the terns
of the Tucker Act, there is subject matter jurisdiction because the United States has consented to
suit).
77. See Ark. Game & ish Comnrn n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 615, nn. 17-18
78. Ark. Game & Fish Conm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1369 (2013).
79. Id. at 1369-75. The other four are "Duration," "Causation," "Severity," mid "Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations."
80. Id. at 1372 (citing Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
81. Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1343. The terminology used in Moden sounded
in subject matter jurisdiction rather than failure to state a clailn on which relief can be granted.
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long line of controlling precedent."
The Moden court explained its view in greater detail in a footnote:
Recently, we summarized the relevant aspect of Ridge Line as requiring that
"a property owner must prove that the asserted government invasion of
property interests allegedly effecting a taking 'was the predictable result of the
government action,' either because it was 'the direct or necessary result' of the
act or because it was 'within the contemplation of or reasonably to be
anticipated by the government. ' '
In fact, this is a high standard, it moves beyond a mere cause-in-fact
relationship evidenced by a strong post hoc argument, to require obviousness
as the words "direct" and "necessary" imply, or alternatively, an even more
subjective standard under which the injury must be "within the contemplation"
of the government at the time that it acts. The cases cited for the proposition
importantly include the exact same citation, John Horsmann Co. v. United
States, as does Justice Ginsburg's A G&FCopinion when it addresses the role
of foreseeability in takings claims."2 Horstmann involved an unprecedented
nineteen-foot water-level rise in a lake where the water level had not varied more
than two feet in the preceding two decades.' The extraordinary rise occurred
in the immediate aftermath of a federal irrigation project that was transporting
water in unlined canals in an area having porous soils." Based on the science
of the time, the government could not be charged with knowledge that the lake
level would rise and destroy the claimant's soda mining operations."
Returning to the A G&PC setting, there is no basis for concluding, as the
Federal Circuit did, that the Corps intended to invade the Commission's rights.'
The record supports the Corps' clear belief, albeit mistaken, that the changes
in operations were not going to have major impacts on the forest 115 miles
downstream of the Clearwater Dam.8 Similarly, the standard that the Federal
Circuit purports to apply adds that the adverse result cannot be the "incidental
or consequential" result of an authorized activity, is the wrong standard.'
Finally, nothing in the entire case record suggests that the Corps deliberately
contemplated utilizing or sacrificing the Commission's parcel, a downstream
site, for its efforts to limit the inundation of upstream fanning parcels. In cases
where there is an intended zone of sacrifice for occasional water disposal both

82. Id.(citations omitted).
83. Id.at n.2 (citing Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir.2004)
(quoting Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1356)).
84. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. CL 511,514 (2012) ("Also relevant
to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeablc result
of authorized government action. See, e.g., John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138,
146 (1921)).
85. John Hortsmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1921).
86. Id.at 143-45.
87. Id.at 146-47.
88. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
89. Ark. Game & Fish Coinm'n, 87 Fed. CI. at 624.
90. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 736 F.3d at 1373.
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Congress and the Corps have opted" for condemnation. "

The Supreme Court cited In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
RailroadCompany, in highlighting the foreseeability issue for remand, which is
even more telling on the degree of foreseeability required to cross the torttakings divide. 3 In the portion of In re Chicagothat the Court pointed out, the
Seventh Circuit poses a hypothetical and issues a warning, supported by
Supreme Court precedent, against allowing this analysis to transmute torts into
takings:
So when does eror "take" property? Suppose agents ofthe FBI, while chasing

a kidnapper, demolish someone's car, or suppose a postal van runs over a
child's tricycle. Do these accidents "take" the car and tricycle? Certainly they
are casualties of the operation of government. Yet despite the contention that
all torts by the government are takings, the Supreme Court has distinguished
the two. Accidental, unintended injuries inflicted by governmental actors are
treated as toils, not takings. And torts are compensable only to the extent the
Federal Tort Claims Act permits. The Court hats never treated limitations on
liability in tort as mere pleading obstacles, to be surmounted by shifting ground
to the Tucker Act. 9'

On remand in AG&FC the Federal Circuit answered the foreseeability
question in this way: "die Corps of Engineers couldhave foreseen that the series
of deviations approved during the 1990s would lead to substantially increased
flooding of the Management Area and, ultimately, to die loss of large numbers
of trees there."' Therefore, the Federal Circuit found a taking on facts and
doctrines that were precisely the kind of tort concepts the Supreme Court has
said should not be deemed a taking because the losses were "accidental" or
"unintended injuries.""
2. Congressionally Granted Immunity and the Separation of Powers Error of
Transmuting Intentional Torts into Takings
Dam operators engaging in flood control, such as die Corps at Clearwater
Dan] in AG&FC,' inherit a predicament that is seldom, if ever, one of their
own making. Congress, when it authorizes the construction of flood control
projects, is responding to strong public safety and welfare concerns. The
underlying physical problem of too much water at various times in various parts

91. A later portion of this Article will argue that even were tie Commission, and others
similarly situated, able to place the case on the takings side of the tort-taking divide and fulfill all
of elements necessary to make out a taking, the nuisance prevention line of cases would operate
to prevent a finding of taking. Sce discussion 6fi-d part III.D.
92. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 702d-dl.
93. Ark. Game & Fish Comni'n v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 511, 522 (2012) (citing In re
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 799 F.2d 317, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1986)).
94. 799 F.2d at 325-26.
95. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1372-73 (emphasis added).
96. Compare In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 799 F.2d 317, 326 (C.A.7
1986), wth United States v.James, 478 U.S. 597 (1986), xudKosak v. United States, 465 U.S.
848, 851, 854 (1984), and Laird v. Nehns, 406 U.S. 797, 801, 803 (1972) (supporting that
unintended injuries are treated as torts, not takings).

97. Ark. Game & Fish Coim'n v. United States, 87 Fcd. Cl. 594, 602 (Fcd. Cl. 2009).
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of the watershed is patent. The maps showing the extent of the Flood of 1927, 9"
the first chapter in the history leading to the construction of Clearwater Dam,
demonstrate the destructive possibilities of flooding in the Black River basin
and its contribution to the broader flooding further downstream after its
confluence with other rivers." l)am construction and its operation are eflorts
at nsk management in the face of an uncontrolled force-the rain falls when and
as it will. The problem is not one of the Corps' making, and the risk
management decision to have a dam is Congress' response to a problem of
regional concern.
Once the dam is built, its operations are a deliberate ellort to impound
water, which would otherwise have damaging downstream effects, and release it
in a pattern that is intended to provide an optimal degree of protection and risk
reduction to downstream properties." Most emphatically, this is not a zerosum game; some release patterns will be substantially more advantageous than
will others. Inevitably, the releases have downstream effects, some of which are
adverse to the interests of individual landowners." ' To provide flood control,
the pool behind the dam must be lowered according to some pattern of the
Corps' choosing. It would be ludicrous to forbid the Corps from seeking to
obtain benefits from its pattern of releases. In fact, whether successful or not,
the Corps in altering the release patterns of the Clearwater Dam was attempting
to increase the total social welfare derived from the pattern of its operations. In
the AG&FC case, fanners lobbied the Corps for the changed release pattern
because they were being harmed by the previous pattern of releases. If changes
in downstream inundation patterns are takings whenever a landowner is
substantially disadvantaged, the Corps' ability to provide the optimal pattern of
flood control and releases is severely compromised. If liability for a taking
could be premised on foreseeable hann, by making any change in an
established pattern of releases the Corps becomes an involuntary insurer of all
newly-suffered downstream losses that result from that change in operations.
The resultant liability would violate a clearly enunciated federal policy and will
hamstring efforts to better adapt to climate change in the future. The Supreme
Court addressed this precise policy matter in Horsonannwhen it refused to find
a taking in regard to unforeseen or unintentional effects: " [a I ny other conclusion
would deter from useful enterprises on account of a dread of incurring
unforeseen and immeasurable liability.""
Congress, when it immunized the Corps from all tort liability for flood
control structures and their operations, was trying to ensure that the Corps was
in a position to operate the dams as it saw best.l" To do that, the Corps needed

98.

See, e.g., Records of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, htip://www.archives.gov/l)uhlication

s/prologue/2007/spring/imnages/coast-miss-flood-.jpg.

99. Id.
100. See Brian D. Richter and Gregory D. Thomas, Rcstonhg Etn'ontenal Rows by
Modifying Darn Opcadions, 12 Ecology & Science 1, art. 12 (2007), http://www.ecologyand
society.org/vol 12/iss 1/artl 2/.
101. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Con'n, 87 Fed. Cl. at 605. Some downstream effects can
be positive, such as releases for environmentally valuable flows, or releases for irrigation, or
downstream municipal use in drier seasons.
102. John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 146 (1921).
103. See33 U.S.C. § 702c (2015).
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to be free of potential claims from any landowner downstream who might be
adversely affected.'0 ' "No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the
United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place." °"
This blanket tort immunity is not limited in any way by the Tucker Act partial
waiver of sovereign immunity, ° and applies nationwide to any project involving
flood control, whether administered
by the Corps, the Bureau of Reclanlation,
0 °
entity.'
federal
other
any
or
Congress clearly understood and intended that discretion was not to be
circumscribed by every nuance of downstream effects traceable to the Corps'
flood control eflorts. The cases interpreting the grant of immunity are quite
emphatic on this point."' Condemnation renains necessary for the dan's
footprint and its intended storage reservoir, but not for the remainder of the
downstream effects, unless deliberately chosen as an intended form of storage
or flowage (as contrasted to release) of water. At the time it enacted 33 U.S.C.
§ 702c granting tort immunity for federal flood control elloils, Congress was
aware that losses caused by flood control actions are not takings and would go
uncompensated."' Representative Snell stated:
I want this bill so drafted that it will contain all the safeguards necessary for the
Federal Government. If we go down there and furnish protection to these
people-and I assume it is a national responsibility-I do not want to have
anything left out of the bill that would protect us now and for all time to come.

104. Id.
105. Ic].
106. An argument can be made that the specific grant of albsolute immunity would require an
even greater showing of planned use of the claimants' lands for disposal of flood waters than the
previous discussion. SeeJacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation,
98 GEO. .J 341, 366 (2010) (explaining the widespread acceptance of die canon that "specific
provisions targeting a particular issue apply instead of provisions more generally covering the
issue"). Other than AG&FC, all of the cases discussed in regard to the tort-taking divide arose in
contexts not governed by 33 U.S.C. § 702c and its specific immunization of flood control
activities.
107. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 628 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. See, e.g., National Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263,270 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 967, 74 S.Ct. 778, 98 L.Ed. 1108 (1954) which stated:
when Congress entered upon flood control on the great scale contemplated by the
(1928 and 1936) Acts it satleguarded the United States against liability of any kind for
damage from or by floods or flood waters in the broadest mad most emphatic language.
Tse cost of flood control works itself would inevitably be very great mad Congress
plainly manifcsted its will that those costs should not have the flood damages that will
inevitably recur added to them.... ITirc is no question of the power and right of
Congress to keep the government entirely free from liability when floods occur,
notwithstanding the great government works undertaken to minimize them. Congress
included Section 3 in the 1928 Act and carried it forward into the 1936 Act and others
with intent to exercise that power completely and to absolutely bar any such federal
liability.
See also, United States v.Jamcs, 478 U.S. 597, 605 (1986) (Tcrms "flood" and "flood waters," in
immunity provision of Flood Control Act applied to all waters contained in or carried through a
federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that.
such projects cannot control.
109. United States v.James, 478 U.S. 597, 606-08 (1986). .5c, e.g., United States v. Iron Mt.
Mines, 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1438-39 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
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I for one do not want to open up a situation that will cause thousands of
lawsuits for damages against the Federal Government in the next 10, 20, or 50
years.

In respect of the possibility of significant uncompensated downstream
losses that would follow from the immunity, Congress has itself buffered the
harshness of that aspect of the immunity by expressly requiring condemnation
of flowage easements 'along parts of the Mississippi River mainstream where
levees are impractical or undesirable and the "lands in such stretch of the river
are subjected to overflow and damage [by the projects] which are not now
Other downstream losses that might arise as a result
overflowed or damaged ....
of the immunity as it related to control and release of floodwaters have been left
without a remedy, For the courts to undo the balance carefully struck by
Congress by lowering the tort-taking demarcation line impermissibly intrudes
on the zone of sovereign immunity that Congress did not surrender. On the
contemporary policy level, the ability to freely reconsider and modify darn flood
control operations supported by the congressionally granted immunity is an
increasingly important principle. As previously described, situations similar to
the AG&FCcase will become more common with the loss of stationarity."' The
Corps, and others operating dans for flood control, will increasingly be faced
with the challenge of devising new release patterns to attempt to minimize
adverse impacts of flooding and to hedge against drought. In the face of such
public exigency, the Corps, and other damn operators, cannot viably rely on any
singular water release pattern. Dam operators will face conditions not foreseen
at the time the dam was built and initial patterns of operations were planned.
The one choice that the citizenry rightfully expects is that dam operators will
chose operations in an attempt to minimize adverse impacts. There will be
winners and losers, but other than cases of deliberate use of downstream
properties to function as a form of additional reservoir capacity, the takings
clause of the Constitution is not implicated by the Corps' discretionary
operational choices.
On remand in AG&FC, the Federal Circuit made an oblique reference to
this issue when it addressed in broad dicta an upstream-downstream distinction,
belatedly raised by the Corps."3 In that stage of the litigation, the Corps, for the
first time, urged that there is a distinct and legally significant difference between
inundating parcels upstream and those downstream of a flood control dam."'
The Federal Circuit summarily rejected the argument. ' It noted that because
the change caused harm to AG&FC in pursuit of conferring a benefit for the
low-lying farms, the Corps could not raise any defense based on the general
benefit being provided to all landowners downstream of the dam."6 The court's
rejection of the Corps' argument, although relevant to the severity of loss issue
that a claimant must be able to show under the regulatory takings doctrine of
110.
111.
112.
113.

69 Cong.Rec. 6641 (1928).
Scc33 U.S.C. § 702c (2015).
Milly et al., supra note 4, at 573.
Ark. Game & Fish Coinm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1375, n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

114.

Id.

115.
116.

Id.at 1375.
Id. at 1375-76, n.4.
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Penn Centrl, obscures the thrust of the upstreamn-downstream distinction.
First, the court's rejection of the Corps' argument overlooks the simple
reality just described-in most situations the water stored in the dam "Vill have
to be released, and when it is released, due to conservation of matter and tie
law of gravity, it has to go somewhere and that somewhere is downstream.
While there may be some cases where there is sufficient capacity in the dam
and favorable downstream conditions, so a release pattern can be totally
benign,'" the far more common pattern will be some downstrean parcels getting
greater benefits than others from the damn operator's chosen patterns of
operations. Correlatively, some downstream parcels will be subjected to less
favorable or adverse effects of the chosen release pattern. Under the Federal
Circuit's improvidently broad language, if there are any "winners," all "losers"
whose losses cross the de minimis threshold have compensable injuries.
Second, the Federal Circuit's position ignores the fact that even the "losers"
remain beneficiaries of the dam's presence because all persons and landowners
downstreamn benefit from safety increases and the reduction of calamitous risks
that the dan provides."' In tie AG&FCsetfing, if the Commission's loss is a
taking, so too, would be the loss of someone whose house now floods during a
higher release period as a direct and provable consequence of the return to the
old release pattern. Upon return to the old releases pattern, what (other than
the statute of limitations) is to stop the farmers, whose requests prompted the
change in tie first place, from claiming that the original operating plan "took"
their lands? Imposing that form of cause-in-fact driven liability on the
government is not a tenable result. Such an approach not only contravenes the
balance deliberately struck by Congress, the Federal Circuit's approach fails to
account in any way lor the harm that the dam's operation prevents, which can
prevent all takings liability.'9
B. UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF THE PROPERT-Y RIGHT TO BE FREE
OF INUNDATION' =

In a setting such as that of the AG&FCcase,Arkansas law defines the property rights of the riparian landowner."' The United States Supreme Court
stated, "the Constitution protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to 'existing rules or

117. Under some conditions, the stored water might evaporate or percolate in suLfficient
quafifity, and/or be diverted from the reservoir for agricultural or water supply purposes in
sufficient quanfity, so that releases above virgin flow are never rcquircl. Those cases, of course,
would impose no damagc to downstream parcels.
118. This aspect of the upstreamn-downstream line is discussed at greater length in the
consideration of the average reciprocity of advantage precedents. See discussion inlia Part
III.D.2.
119. SSe discussion infra Part III.1).2.
120. This Article will linit itself to a discussion of reasonable use riparianism as the state water
law governing the right to be trce of inundation. Not only is that the dominant water law of the
areas where most flood control dans operate, even prior appropriation states borrow reasonable
use riparianism principles to govern sonic aspects of riparian ownership other than die right to
divert. and appropriate the water, such as tie correlative rights of co-riparians to make recreafional
use of die water surface. See, e.g., Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1956) (holding that
recreational rights and privileges of riparian proprietors are violated by one owner's overuse).
121. See South Flag Lake v. Gordon, 307 S.W.3d 601,604-05 (Ark. CL App. 2009).
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understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.""' The
question of what rights, if any, are being taken by the Corps in AG&FC, therefore, begins with a consideration of those state law property rights, the point
from which diminution of value or right to be free of invasion are measured. A
pointed example of this principle is the Court's unanimity on that issue in Stop
the Beach Re-nounrhment v. loida Departmenl of El vironmental Protection. In that case the entire Court agreed that, under Florida property law, the
petitioners lacked the rights they claimed were taken when the government implemented the beach re-nourishment law.' 4 As a result there could be no taking
of property."
In the AG&FC litigation, the issue of Arkansas property rights is
conspicuously absent." The government did not raise it and, prior to the case
reaching the Supreme Court, neither the Court of Federal Claims 7 nor the
Federal Circuit" cited a single Arkansas case. When the litigation reached the
high court, justice Ginsburg's opinion noted:
But Arkansas law was not examined by the Federal Circuit, and therefore is
not properly pursued in this Court. Whether arguments for an upstream/
downstream distinction and on the relevance of Arkansas law have been
are questions appropriately
preserved and, if so, whether they have merit,
addressed to the Court of Appeals on remand. ' 2
On remand, the Federal Circuit ruled that any dispute regarding the content
of the Commission's property right under state law had not been preserved, and
likewise ruled, as a consequence, the Corps could not raise the role of the
Commission's investment-backed expectations.'"2 In that way, the Corps' failure
to contest the scope of the Connission's property rights had two impactsconsideration of the basic nature of the right claimed to be violated was foregone
and application of one or more key aspect of the Court's usual takings tes' 2 ' was
precluded.
In regard to the Management Area, Arkansas' longstanding adherence to
reasonable use riparianism as its principal water law makes it difficult to
precisely measure state law property rights and riparian rights.' 2 The rights
created are correlative rights to a common pool resource, and what is a
reasonable use of one parcel may have an impact on other riparian parcels and

122. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (quoting Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
123. Stop die Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept.of Envd. Prot., 560 U. S.702 (2010).
124. Id. at 732.
125. Id.
126. See Ark. Gaine & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 594 (2009); Ark. Game &
Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d.
127. See Ark. Gaine& lsh Comm'n, 87 Fed. Cl. 594.
128. See Ark. Gaine & Fish Coinm'n, 637 F.3d 1366.
129. Ark. Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 511, 522 (2012) (citation
omitted).
130. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n. v. U.S., 736 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
131. See 133 S. Ct. at522-23.
132. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Ark. 1955).
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their potential uses. The leading Arkansas case is Hari's v. Brooks."3 The
opinion in that case, which involved an irrigation depletion in competition with
a co-riparian's in situ recreational use of the waterbody that relied on
maintenance of an appropriate water level, adopts several ideas presented by
the Restatement (First) of Torts Section 852. Having particular relevance to the
AG&FC case, the Arkansas Supreme Court quoted a passage from the
Restatement:
It is axiomatic in the law that individuals in society must put up with a
reasonable amount of annoyance and inconvenience resulting fiom the
otherwise lawful activities of their neighbors in the use of their land. Hence it
is only when one riparian proprietor's use of the water is unreasonable that
another who is harmed by it can complain, even though the harm is
intentional. Substantial intentional harm to another cannot be Justified as
which produces it
reasonable unless the legal merit or utility of the activity
34
outweighs the legal seriousness or gravity of the harm.
The Corps' actions in the AG&FC case exceeded mere annoyance or
inconvenience if the Commission sufficiently proved the Corps caused the
increased inundation, which in turn destroyed the hardwoods. Equally,
however, Arkansas law requires that even if a respondent's actions are properly
characterized as intentional, and the impact is substantial, those actions may still
be considered legally reasonable based on "legal merit or utility.' The broader
pattern of flood control has immense utility. Thus, even though the Corps
intentionally (in the traditional tort law sense) changed its pattern of releases,
and even if the Corps had known (which they initially did not) that harm would
inure to a downstream co-riparian, the law of riparianism considers the whole
picture, including the utility of the action taken." Under Arkansas principles,
the Clearwater Dam in this case is protecting vast tracts of land, including homes
and businesses from flooding. That is an act having great utility. The Corps'
operation of a flood control dam, even if not the most typical riparian use, is a
riparian use nonetheless. Recalling that the property rights of all co-riparians
are correlative, the myriad of benefits attributable to the darn's flood control
operations are germane to determining the riparian rights of others in the basin.
Only a small number of Arkansas cases have decided issues of riparian
rights, but a comparatively recent case, South Flag Lake, Inc. v. Gordon,'7
addressed the situation in which the court held use on one parcel was
reasonable in spite of causing a considerable amount of continuing inundation
of a co-riparian's lands. The claimed injury of the inundated co-riparian in
South FlagLake is not as dramatic as the AG&FC claims of forest injury and
Nevertheless, South FlagLake and
did not involve major economic value.'
other Arkansas cases establish there is no per se rule that would support
AG&FC in a claim that Arkansas law gives them an absolute property right to

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id
Id.at 135 (citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 852 cnit. c (1939)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
South Flag Lake v. Gordon, 307 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Ark. CL App. 2009).
Id.

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 19

be free of alterations of watercourse conditions, including those that increase
inundation of their parcel. ' The public welfare benefits provided by the dam
militate in favor of a finding that the Corps' flood control use is of sufficient
utility to be reasonable, even in the face of a substantial interference with the
parcel of a co-riparian."' Indeed, this might be exactly the type of case in which
the doctrine of darnnum absque injuri--damage without legal injury-is
properly applied.' Under that analysis, it is likely that the taking claim of the
Commission in this case would fail because there was no invasion of a property
right under Arkansas law. Even if Arkansas law deemed the Corps' actions to
invade the Commission's riparian rights, the case would still have to move to
the second stage where the court finds a regulatory taking of property under the
Fifth Amendment.'42
As litigated, one of the Commission's claims was that the inundation of its
lands caused by the changed pattern of dam operations should be treated as
falling under the "physical invasion" line of takings cases,'" the most prominent
of which is Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CA TV Corporation.'" It is vital
to note that Loretto involved a permanent physical invasion of the landowner's
property and on that basis alone constituted a taking of property.'" The
Government argued that the lack of inundation permanence in AG&FCwas a
bright line "no taking" argument, which became the principal ground for the
Federal Circuit's reversal in the original appeal.'" The Supreme Court,
however, expressly disavowed the bright line reading of the importance of
permanence. Thus, the Court held only that temporary physical invasions may
be takings, leaving open whether they are takings to be decided on a case-bycase basis.' The Court added guidance for that determination by indicating that
the duration of the intrusion was a relevant consideration in determining the
extent of the detriment claimant suffered when making the takings decision.'"
In assessing the importance of the duration and nature of the physical
invasion in the takings calculus, state property law, again, is relevant because it
sets the expectations of the landowner. Here, too, Arkansas' reasonable use
riparianism cases reject the possibility that a riparian can have a reasonable
139. Barboro v. Boyle, 178 S.W. 378 (Ark. 1915); Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark.
1955) (addressing irrigation in competition with recreational boating); Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val
Poultry Co., 306 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. 1957) (extending reasonable use test to groundwater); Scott
v. Slaughter, 373 S.W.2d 577 (Ark. 1963) (balancing water-based commercial hunting and fishing
use). These cases are recounted in greater detail in the Amicus Brief filed by Professors of Law
Teaching in the Property Law and Water Rights Fields in Ark. Game & Fish Commission v.
United States, 133 S. CL 511 (2012). The author of this Article was counsel for that Amicus.
140. Brief of Professors of Law Teaching in the Property Law and Water Rights Fields As
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8-9, Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States,
133 S. CL 511 (2012) (No. 11-597).
141. See J. Nelson Happy, Damnum Absque Ijuria: When Pivate Property May be
Damaged Without Compensationin Missour, 36 Mo. L. Rev. 453 (1971).

142. As considered more fully later, it is likely that this would not be a regulatory taking. See
discussion infra Part I1I.C; Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 US. 104, 131 (1978).
143. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
144. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).

145. Id.
146. Ark. Gaine& Pish Comm'n, 637 F.3d at 1372.
147. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441-42.
148. SeeArk. Game & Fish Coinm'n v. United States, 133 S. CL 511, 522-23 (2012).
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expectation that the riparian fee is an inviolate area immune from any physical
encroachment or intrusion. ' This is true not only when the "invasion" is
caused by water inundating portions of the parcel as in South Flag, but also
when the invasion involves use of surface waters overlying a riparian's
property." Thus, under Arkansas law, the fact that the inundation can be
characterized as a temporary physical invasion does not imply that the
invasionary nature is the key factor in the broader takings analysis. If anything,
Arkansas' law of riparian rights suggests that owners of riparian tracts should
have little expectation that their riparian fee is an exclusive domain.
The takings test the Supreme Court pointed to also assesses the totality of
circumstances to determine the extent of the deprivation. '' In HuTJs v. Brooks,
and in cases involving use of waters overlying privately owned beds, the public
interest weighs heavily as a limitation on claimed rights of riparian proprietors
in Arkansas.' 2 Here, while the Commission is a public entity, the forest use for
which it seeks compensation as a taking is proprietary in nature and is in
competition with the public use of flood control. As noted above, even if it was
negligent in its disregard or miscalculation of the potential and actual
downstreamn effects its dam operations might cause, the Corps acted in
pursuance of the highly important public interest of flood control. The Corps'
actions make it less likely that tie Commission, as a riparian proprietor, can
claim a reasonable expectation to be wholly free of physical invasion of its
parcel."'
C. APPLYING THE TAKINGS TIST OF PENN CENTRALTO A G&FCAND
SIMILAR DOWNSTREAM INUNDATION CASIS

Penn Central Transportation Conpany v. City ofNew York'4 is generally
considered the leading case for framing the analysis in alleged regulatory takings
cases. Penn Centraloffersguidance for determining when a regulation is a valid
exercise of police power, and when it steps over the murky divide and "goes too
far,"'" becoming a taking of property. The Penn Centrd contribution is its
See generallySouth Flag Lake v. Gordon, 307 S.W.3d 601 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009).
See generally, BARTON THOMPSON, JR., JOHN LI.ESHY, & ROBERT ABRAMs, LEGAL
CONTROL OF WATER REsouRcEs, 74-85 (5th cd. 2013) (addressing rights of co-riparians to use
149.

150.

the entire surface of the waterbody); Id.at 613 (discussing state law navigability as determining
the right of the general public to use waters superiacent to privately owned beds of lakes and
streams). On this latter point, Arkansas is one of the leading states that has moved to open
formerly private waters to public use by expanding its navigability concept, which state law
precedents have long deemed to be a concept that considers the public's interest in use of the
common pool resource. See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Ark. 1980); Barboro v.
Boyle, 178 S.W. 378 (Ark. 1915).

151. Ark. Gamne & Fish Corm'm,

133 S. C. at 521

152. Haris v. Brooks, 383 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955).
153. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n. v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1375-76, n. 4 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (appearing to conclude on remand that the Corps was not acting in the public interest
in this case because the impetus and one of the results of the changed operation was to benefit
farming interests located closer to tie dam. That assessment totally ignores the fact that the
historic pattern of releases had imposed losses, albeit less drantic and possibly less economically
important, on the fanning parcels that could not be cultivated due to the lonner pattern of
releases.).
154. Penn Cent.Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-38 (1978).
155. Id. at 124-25; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at
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three-part test: (i) the loss must be substantial and the whole parcel, not merely
the affected portion, is the baseline to consider how much has been taken; (ii)
the inquiry must account only for the landowner's justifiable investment backed
expectations; and (iii) the character of the governmental interest has a place in
the determination. 6 In AG&FC, on remand, the Corps' earlier litigation
choices either waived or limited the facts considered in making some of these
inquiries.'" However, if the case was litigated on a clean slate, the Commission
and claimants in similar circumstances, would have a difficult time satisfying any
of the Penn Centralparts.
1. Economic Impact on the Owner Using the Parcel as a Whole Baseline
Under the first factor, the Management Area still possesses great value to
the Commission and the citizens of Arkansas. The parcel-as-a-whole analysis
would suggest that there is substantial value remaining and that the parcel is still
able to serve its intended uses as a refuge, reserve, mad public recreation area.
In other temporary inundation cases, even severe short-term impacts may leave
the parcel with many valuable uses, including uses of the remainder of the parcel
while a portion of the parcel is adversely affected." '
2. Interference with Investment Backed Expectations
There does not seem to be a justifiable expectation that flooding will not
impact the Management Area, which is low-lying and is subject to inundation in
almost every year. That lack of justifiable expectation may be oil'set by the
recurring nature of the Corps' operations, which give the interference
continuing character that no longer corresponds to the expectation of variable
flooding that might cause harm." ' The state law of reasonable use riparianism
undercuts the expectation that a co-riparians' actions must cause no interference
by inundation-all riparian lands are burdened by the correlative reasonable
uses of co-riparians.' ° In this regard, certain Arkansas cases direcdy allirm the
propriety of co-riparians' actions that alter patterns of inundation in others'
parcels.'6 Similarly, in AG&PCthere is no purposeful investment in the forest
least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
156. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT PLATER, ROBERT ABRAMs, ROBERT GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING,
DAVID WIRTH & NoAH HALl., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoIJcy: NATURE, LAW, AND

SocIwry 917 (4th ed. 2010).
157. Ark. Game & Fish Colnm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(finding, on remand, that the United States had not preserved key aspects of the Penn Central
test and did not even cite Pcnn Centralinits opinion. Had those issues been preserved, all three
elements of the Penn Centraltest point to a no taking result).
158. Another factor affecting loss calculation in Penn Ccntralwas the grant to the landowner
of transferable development rights, which partially offset. the loss. See 438 U.S. at 137. In
AG&FC and similar cases, even the "losers" on the downstream side of a flood control dam are
obtaining a substantial benefit from the increases to safety and reduction of calamitous risks that
the dam is providing. See Ark. Ganie & Fish Comnm'n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Fromme v. United States, 412 F.2d 1192 (Cl. CL 1969)).
159. Ark. Game & Fish Com'n v. United States, 133 S. CL 511, 522 (2012) (finding that a
permanent physical invasion would suggest a per se taking under Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).

160. See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955).
161. See supra note 138.
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resource for its ongoing production of timber. The refuge was created for
conservation and recreation purposes, anr issue deemed to have been waived in
the case.'62 Looking generally at cases where the lowest-lying portions of a
riparian parcel immediately adjoining a flood-prone strean are inundated, it
would seem to be imprudent and Luijustified to invest heavily in the continued
freedom of those areas from inundation.
3. Character of tie Governmental Action
The character of the governmental interest, the third Penn Centlralfactor,
has not received extensive elaboration from the Court. The most direct effort
to explore the content of that flactor appears in Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island"' After describing Penn Central as the
"polestar" of takings jurisprudence and borrowing phrases from that case, she
stated:
We have eschewed "any 'set formula' lor determining when 'justice mad
airness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons." The outcome instead "depends largely 'upon

the particular circumstances fin thati case.'"

We have "idenfiied several

factors that have particular significance" in these "essentially ad hoc, factual

inquiries." Two such factors are "Itlhe economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations." Another is "the character of
the governmental action." Die purposes served, as well as the effects
produced, by a particular regulation infOrm the takings amalysis."
In virtually every case, courts consider the building and subsequent
operation of a flood control dam to be a fundamentally important and uniquely
public purpose, the protection of all interests in the flood plain below the dam.
Thus, in downstream flooding cases, the character of the government action
weighs heavily in favor of the government in the ad hoc takings balance. Like
several other areas of constitutional adjudication, takings law applies a sliding
scale analysis, which, when applied to the Corps' flood control actions, accords
the Corps far greater leeway before a taking can be lound. Thus, because the
Corps' actions here are in the service of flood control, the court will accord far
greater leeway before finding a taking.'"
D. NUISANCE PREVENTION CASES
The Supreme Court has long recognized that governmental regulations that
proscribe either illegal or nuisance activities are not takings. There is an
162. Ark. Game & Fish CoInmi, 133 S. Ct. at 516.
163. Palazxolo v. Rhodc Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634-35 (2001) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
164. Id at 633-65 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
165. .Scsupra note 137. The same tactor is important in the state law detcrminafion of
propcrty rights and further limits the rcasonablc cxpcctations of all owners below a flood control
dam to be frce of dan-operadon-causcd variations in die natural flow of the watercourse.
Similarly, the sane factor, the prevention of great public harm is an independent consideration

that brings AG&FCand cases like it into die nuisance prevention line of cases. Sce inkfa Part
IlI.D.
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underlying character to such actions-they protect the public at large from
potential hanns to public welfare, including protections of morals, health and
safety, and even protecting local economies from disruption. So, for example,
enforcement of a law requiring the closing of a distillery during prohibition," or
a law barring operation of brick mill, 7 or continued quarrying in residential
area,1'6 all withstood constitutional challenges despite near total losses of value
to the regulated owners. The case From this line that is most like the destruction
of the Commission's hardwood forest is Miller v. Schoene.69 In Miller,state
law required owners of cedar trees afflicted with cedar rust, a disease that does
not adversely affect the cedars, to destroy diseased trees at their own expense to
prevent infection of nearby apple orchards, which were seriously harmed by the
disease.' The Court in Millerunanimously upheld protection of public welfare
against a takings challenge."' That holding placed a direct loss on the affected
cedar tree owners, who were required to act wholly within their own property
to cut and remove cedar trees, at their own expense, for the welfare of the
well-being of a discrete class of citizens,
broader community and the economic
72
those in the apple growing industry.
1. Protecting the Public by Preventing Greater Harm via Triage
There is a close parallel to Millerin the AG&FCsetfing. At the time the
challenged regulatory action occurs, there are indirectly competing users of an
intertwined resource complex and the government may, without taking
property, regulate the manner in which the uses are to be accommodated.'7 ' In
Miller the regulator chose to protect the apple industry against harm at the
expense of the cedar tree owners; in A C&FC the Corps, as regulator of dam
operations, chose to protect the low-lying farmers at the expense of the forest. '
Both the Virginia legislature and the Corps faced an unavoidable decisiondoing nothing, i.e., not changing the current obligations of cedar tree owners or
the pattern of dam operations, decides the issue in favor of one set of private
uses and against the other. For the Virginia legislature, it was a choice between
cedar trees and apples. The Corps also faced a choice because it must release
the impounded water from a previous high flow period in order to empty the
reservoir to be able to store water that would pose the next threat of a major
regional flood event. Inevitably, even though the Corps might not have
recognized the choice at the time, every release pattern has downstream
consequences
The Corps is, in essence, engaged in a form of triage that attempts to limit
the adverse flooding consequences in the basin. This is no different than the
166. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887).
167. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915).
168. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 590-91 (1962).
169. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
170. Id. at 277.
171. Id. at 279.
172. Id.at279-280.
173. Scc gencially,Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Jrivate Propcrty, and Public Rights, 81 YAI. L.J.
149, 149-50 (1971) (discussing the takings clause basis for attempts to overcome property
regulations).
174. See Ark. Gamne & Fish Comm'n v.United States, 133 S. Ct 511, 515 (2012).
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Virginia legislature when it forced cedar tree removal to protect the apple
industry. The impetus for building the Clearwater Dam was precisely thatmitigating flood risks that would occur in the absence of building the Clearwater
Dam in the first place. Once built, the Corps, in making releases, is choosing
among operational patterns to maximize the net flood risk reduction benefits.
Necessarily, that choice, as in AG&FC, will provide some with greater and
others with lesser benefits and burdens. In AG&PCthe Corps was doing just
that, trying to provide additional flood protection to the lfaners in Missouri just
below the darn by altering its release patterns.'" No doubt, the Corps may have
wrongly assessed the consequences of its change in dan operations and, by
reducing release-induced flooding for the farmers, increased release-induced
flooding for the forest. What that action presents is a question of how to
manage excess water and poor decision making, not a taking of property.
The Miller holding is not in any way qualified or limited to cases in which
the governmental choice of course of action is completely correct. As to the
Corps' allegedly poor predictive performance, under the Miller rationale,
takings is not the remedy. Unfortunately for the Commission and others
harmed by Corps possible negligence'76 in carrying out the triage, tort remedies
are unavailable because Congress has granted the Corps immunity.'7 The
Miller Court would have rejected the takings claim, even if there had been
evidence that the state forestry oflicial had been wrong in believing that
destroying the cedar trees was the best way to protect the apple orchards, or
even if the forester had been wrong that destroying the cedar trees would be
The nuisance
effective at preventing the harm to the apple orchards.'
prevention and quarantine-triage line of defense to taking claims is that broad.
The Supreme Court's well-known decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council" strongly supports that view, even if the destruction of the
hardwoods could be considered a Lucas "wipeout."' Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion states:
A law or decree with such an effect [i.e., a law that imposes a "wipeout"I must,
in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected
persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
comDlementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or
otherwise. 8'

175. Ark. Game& Fish Coin ', 133 S. CL at516
176. Assessing whether the Corps was negligent is not the objective here. What is factually
established is dhat the Corps eventually agreed that its actions were a substantial causative factor
(though not the only one) that resulted in the loss of the timber. Importantly, whether negligence
is involved or not is immaterial to the takings issue. I'lat the remedy available to AG&FC must

sound in tort is highly relevant inasmuch as Congress has closed off that avenue.

177. CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R,L34131, FI.OOD )DAMAGE RELATE1)
TiO ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS PROJECrs: SELECITED LEGAL ISSUES (2011).

178. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
Lucas, v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992).
Id.at 1016 n.7. Under the "parcel as a whole" calculus relied upon in Penn Centraland
other cases, tie loss of the hardwoods here is nota wipeout. See supra Part III., C., I.
181. Id at 1029 (footnote omitted).
179.
180.

WA TER LA WRE'VIEW

Volume 19

While some might argue that statement assists the Commission, because
maintaining the Management Area is surely itself a commendable publicbenefitting use, the passage just quoted from Lucas concludes with a footnote
that states:
The principal "otherwise" that we have in mind is litigation absolving the State
(or private parties) of liability for the destruction of "real and personal
property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire" or to
forestal othergrave threats to the lives andproperty ofothers.'
In relation to the AG&FCcase, the worst that can be said of the Corps'
actions, which are alleged to have inflicted the hanm, is that the change in the
release pattern was ill-chosen and unnecessary. The purpose being served,
active engagement in the management of water collected and stored to prevent
flooding, insulates the Corps from takingsliability. The claim of a taking cannot
be strengthened by arguing that the release of water to bestow a benefit on the
farmers 8"' is separate from the flood control effort and therefore, should not be
covered by the nuisance prevention precedents. As is patently clear, the water
the Corps stored behind Clearwater Dam to prevent or limit flooding
downstream must eventually be released, lest the dam have no storage capacity
available for the next spring high-water season, or for a summer or fall extreme
rainfall event. '
The triage metaphor makes quite clear the point that no takings liability
should attach to flood control operations. The Corps' releases and active
engagement serves to prevent public harm as a form of triage that takes place
on two levels. The first level of triage inflicts a lesser harm (small inundations
caused by the releases) to ensure that the storage is available for a potentially
major flood event. The second level of triage tries to make those releases in a
way that cause minimal harm. Getting it wrong on the second level is not a
taking. At worst it reflects a negligent calculation of effects that may be tortious
in nature, but it is not compensable as a taking. To use Justice Scalia's words,
the Corps' releases, which inevitably must be made in one pattern or another,
are made "to forestall lal grave threat[si to the lives and property of others."'
2. Average Reciprocity of Advantage Cases and the Harm-Benefit Distinction
Although it is has not been a prominent aspect of contemporary takings law
or takings scholarship," historically the Supreme Court has espoused, and has
182. Id. at n.16 (citations omitted).
183. The harm prevention-benefit bestowal dichotomy is more fully discussed infra part
1II.D.2.
184. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2015). Interestingly, the Great Flood of 1927, which occurred outside
of the usual flood season, was a galvanizing event that led Congress to authorize the program that

led to the construction of the Clearwater Dam. Thc flood map shows the date of that flood to
have been in October.
185. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16 (citations omitted).
186. See Lynda J. Oswald, 7he Role of the 'HaJ7m/Bcnefit" and "Average Reciprocity of
Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1447, 1489 n.218
(1997) (classifying the operation of the average reciprocity of advantage doctrine thusly: "Although
most government regulations that confer a benefit are compensable takings, the average
reciprocity of advantage rule identifies a critical subset of government actions that, although they
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never repudiated, a doctrine that there is no taking of property when a
landowner suffering a loss through operation of a government project also is a
member of the class that benefits from the project.' The doctrine is most
famously mentioned in 1922 as part of Justice Holnes' Pennsylvan'a Coal
opinion." The doctrine's content and application, however, can primarily be
traced to a small series of cases cited byJustice Holmes in support of his 1922
opinion inJackmnm v. Rosenbaum Co., in which he stated:
In the State Court the judgment was justified by reference to the power of the
State to impose burdens upon property or to cut down its value in various ways
without compensation, as a branch of what is called the police power. The
exercise of this has been held warranted in some cases by what we may call the
average reciprocity of advantage, although the advantages may not be equal inl
the particular case."
Jackinm rejected a takings challenge by the owner of an existing structure
to a state statute authorizing construction using a party wall so urban properties
could be developed with no intervening space.'" The three earlier Supreme
Court decisions, which Holmes relied upon as having established the doctrine,''
were quite varied factually. The first involved a drainage district within which
all parcels were subject to a considerable tax burden to pay for a progran that
would enhance the value of all parcels.'2 The second involved an irrigation
district in which all parcels, including those not in need of the district's lacilities,
were subject to the tax."' The third involved a solvent bank challenging a
deposits guarantee system funded by taxing all state banks' deposits.'4 The
common element between those cases and Jackmian is that the claimants
seeking a takings remedy opposed the program and its application and were
denied relief because they received program benefits.''
The applicability of the average reciprocity of advantage doctrine is
straightforward in cases of downstream damage caused by a flood control dam
releases of stored water. All of the parcels greatly benefit from the first level of
triage-the presence of the dam and its operations prevent or mitigate disastrous
tlooding. Even at the second level of triage, in choosing a pattern of releases,
the dam operator is still within the bounds of the average reciprocity of
advantage doctrine. Assuming the dam operator is making a good faith effort
to maximize benefits and limit losses, there is benefit to the entire group that
need not be distributed identically and which may be burdensome to and
opposed by a subset of the afected group.
The average reciprocity of advantage argument was not fully considered in

convey a private or mixed public/private benclit, are nonetheless valid police power actions").
187. Id.at 1489.
188. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
189. Jaclnkan v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S.606, 607-610 (188.5).
193. Fallbrook Irrigation )ist v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 114, 120-22 (1896).
194. Noble State Bankv. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 109 (1911).
195. 260 U.S. at30.
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the AG&FClifigation. The Corps, belatedly and at best obliquely tried to raise
this line of argument when the case was on remand from the Supreme Court.'"
The Corps then, for the first time, urged that in regard to flood control dams
there was a distinct and legally significant difference between inundating parcels
upstream of the dam and those downstream of the (lam.' 9 Apart from being
untimely, the Corps' suggestion hardly pinpoints tie average reciprocity of
advantage argument that would give it credence in defending against the
Commission's taking claim.
As a counterpoint to the average reciprocity of advantage doctrine that
limits the possibility of takings, tie harm-benefit distinction most clearly comes
into play when a claimant is met with the nuisance prevention "defense" to a
takings claim, and tries to avoid that, defense by arguing that the government
action is one that inflicts the harm in order to bestow a benefit, and not an action
that prevents harm. '
Simply put, the harm/benefit test states that a regulation intended to prevent a
public harm is a valid exercise of the police power (for which no compensation
is required), while a regulation intended to confer a public benefit is potentially
a regulatory taking (for which compensation is constitutionally mandated).'
The AG&FC litigation facts suggest the harm-benefit distinction because
the triggering event for the Corps' action was the farmers' request for a change
in dam operations that would result in a longer growing season." Eventually,
on remand, the Corps apparently, and quite obliquely, tried to suggest the
nuisance prevention and average reciprocity of advantage lines of argument by
urging an upstream-downstrean distinction as a reason to find that no taking
The Federal Circuit summarily rejected the argument,
had occurred."
particularly as the court considered its application to the case at bar." In doing
so the Federal Circuit appeared to accept the applicability of the harm-benefit
test to the case:
The government also suggests that a downstream property owner's interest in
not being flooded by a flood control project is different from an upstream
owner's interest, because property downstream from a dam is not occupied by
the project but is the intended beneficiary of the project, which is designed to
reduce flooding impacts. It may often be the case that a downstream property
owner is the beneficiary of a flood control project. That is not true, however,
when the project results in substantially increased flooding of one downstream
owner's property due to efforts to benefit other downstream properties, such
as the agricultural lands that were the intended beneficiaries of the deviations

196. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1375 n.4 (2013).
197. Id.
198. Lynda J. Oswald, 7hc Role of the "HarnVBcnctit" and 'Average Reciprocity of
Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1449, 1452 (1997).
Oswald, supra note 188, at 1452.
199. Id.
200. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. CL 511, 516 (2012).
201. Ark. Gaine & Fsh Cornm'n, 736 F.3d at 1375 n.4.
202. Id.at 1375.
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at issue in this case.N

Three aspects of the Federal Circuit's response merit comment because of
the likelihood that the decision will be misapplied in the future. The upstreamdownstream distinction is relevant. Not only does it demarcate the principal
zone of intentionality that requires condemnation to locate the dam footprint
and upstream reservoir, it is also the dividing line separating the area in which
public harm prevention is manifest and will defeat a takings claim. Secondly,
the response of the Federal Circuit incorrectly applies the harm-benefit
distinction by assessing this case as a benefit-only case because of the favorable
treatment to farmers, while ignoring the broad harm prevention provided to all
downstream landowners. Taking that point a step further, even though the
Corps' action in AG&FC was taken in hopes of providing a benefit to the
farmers, the "benefit" was, in fact, an effort to prevent or reduce a long-imposed
alternative harm suffered by those farmers due to the prior pattern of releases.
More generally, all triage cases face the choice of limiting harn before
considering the harm someone else is likely to suffer. Thus, in the context of
obligatory releases of stored potential floodwater, the harm-benefit distinction
should be of no avail in the effort to resuscitate a takings claim against the
nuisance prevention line of cases.
The Federal Circuit's broad formulation to uncritically treat the case as a
benefit bestowal case, which is a taking for those who suffer substantial losses,
has a final important flaw-overbreadth will invite an avalanche of litigation. As
written, the Federal Circuit's remand opinion appears to allow any downstream
"loser" suffering "substantially increased flooding" to state a prima facie case of
compensable taking on that basis alone. ' The floodgates of litigation argument,
like any "parade of horribles" argument, should not be allowed to detract
attention from the legal merits and policies of the area. In this setting, avoiding
a welter of takings litigation, almost all of which should fail on the merits, acts
in furtherance of the policies that are in play when the government acts to
protect the citizenry and promote the general welfare. The Corps acts pursuant
to congressional instruction to operate the dam for flood control purposes,
exercising its discretion regarding how best to accomplish that goal. In that
setting the policy bias is in favor of allowing the governmental official freedom
to operate. A similar policy allows granting goverinent officials' qualified
immunity from personal liability for violating an individual's constitutional
rights when that official's actions do not violate clearly established law.' In this
setting Congress has gone a step further and given blanket tort immunity to
federal flood control operations,' and it would be odd indeed to allow a

203. Id. at 1375, n.4.
204. See Complaint. at 69-70, Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United Slates, No. 14-183L 2015 WL
2330302 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 5, 2014).
205. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See also, Plunihoffv. Rickard,
134 S.Ct. 2012 (2014) (confirming the need for interlocutory appeals of the issue to prevent the
official for die burdens of litigation where the immunity sought is claimed to have been denied
erroneously by the trial court).,
206. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2015). The concern with a floodgate of litigation is expressly noted
in the legislative history. See 69 Cong. Rec. 6641 (daily ed. April 17, 1928) (statement of Rep.
Snell).
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lowered takings threshold to force the federal official to litigate every incidental
loss.

Taken together, the cavalier rejection of the issues raised by an upstreamdownstream distinction renders the standard applied by the Federal Circuit
troubling and ripe for abuse. The court's approach appears to reduce these

cases from a full "takings vel non inquiry" to instead require little more than
proof of causally linked substantial losses as the basis for finding a taking. "
Results that would follow upon that line of analysis are tantamount to requiring
the government to serve as an involuntary insurer of all such substantial losses.
This proves too much, too easily..8 and violates the standards set down by the
Supreme Court both as to the tests to apply for temporary inundations, and in
regard to the tort-taking distinction.

IV. FAuNESS-BASED COMPENSATION FOR DISPROPORTIONATE BURDENS
WITHOUT RESORTING TO TAKINGS LAW
A. RFASONS IN POLICY TO PAY COMPENSATION

This Article takes a sympathetic view of the Commission's plight in its
litigation while steadfastly arguing that a taking of property did not occur. The
avoidable loss of a bottomland hardwood forest due to the Corps' apparent
unresponsiveness and possibly flawed analysis is an ecological tragedy that
should have been averted. The result is made worse by the fact that the impetus
for the change seems to have little societal benefit or importance. The triggering
event was a self-interested request from farmers seeking to obtain a marginal
benefit in the productivity of their lands.2" That should not obscure the fact
that, even in cases imposing significant and palpably unfair losses consequent
upon downstream inundation of lowlands, the Corps must be given a broad
range of discretion to manage flood control operations without requiring
compensation. This is both legally and practically the proper result.
Moving away from its specific facts, what the AG&FCsituafion illustrates at
a social engineering level is the conundrum of what to do when protecting one
set of lands from flooding necessarily involves burdening other lands with a less
advantageous result. As adverted to earlier, with the increasing frequency of
extreme weather events, the Corps and other dam operators are ever more
likely to undertake management strategies that are in the nature of two-level
triage rather than universal protection. The first level of triage involves
capturing the potentially destructive flows and impounding them for the benefit
of all in the downstream flood plain. The second level of triage relates to
determining how best to release the stored floodwaters. At this second level,
the optimal triage policy will not always be evident due to the complexities of
modeling basin-wide results of particular management decisions in a system as
dynamic as a storm-affected basin, having too much water and too little reservoir

207. Ark. Game& Fish Comm'n, 736 F.3d at 1372.
208. Sec supra Parts III., A., B. and C.
209. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. C. 511, 516 (2012).
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capacity to hold it all back for gradual and totally "safe" release. It seems unfair
to force some of the downstream owners, who are all equally in harm's way, to
bear disproportionate losses when the flood control manager decides on a
release pattern. The sense of unfairness and the disproportionate loss
allocation are no less even when one recognizes thail the flood control manager
did not contribute to the natural events that produced the water, mad has no
choice but to act and release the stored water.
1. Fairness as the Avoidance of Demoralization Losses
What remains is to bring fairness for adversely aflfected landowners back
into the equation." ' The need to compensate beyond what is constitutionally
required is advocated in one of the iconic articles in the takings literature.
Professor Frank Michelman, who also subscribed strongly to the breadth of tie
nuisance prevention line of cases as negating takings claims,' argued that there
should be voluntary compensation for "demoralizing" losses that are not
compensable as takings." ' Perhaps AG&FC is such a case where the Corps
should compensate the Commission for policy reasons. The more general
point is that these flood control settings hold the potential for very uneven
degrees of loss that were avoidable, or could have been distributed differently
under an alternative flood control strategy. Unlike some other situations, flood
control efforts will frequently present a means for fairly funding and
implementing a non-constitutional system to provide compensation for
adversely affected landowners suflering signilicant and disproportionate losses.
Case-specific solutions are, at times, available. The most obvious of these
are executive disaster declarations that distribute specialized aid to disaster
victims, in this case, floods. Those do not seem apposite in the genre of cases
like AG&FCbecause the harm, though substantial is neither widespread nor of
regional significance. Special congressional legislation can at times be obtained.
That fits the AG&FC circumstances quite nicely, but such legislation is
exceptional and not a systemic remedy.
2. Partial Revocation of Tort Immunity to Ensure Reasoned Decisions
A lirst-level, more systemic corrective is to narrow the scope of
governmental tort immunity. To a degree, the courts have already begun to do
this, by stepping in and policing the line between acts of the federal dan
operator in furtherance of flood control and unrelated activities-the immunity
extends only to the fomer."' None of the arguments adduced in this Article
have any force when the governmental action is not in furtherance of flood
210. 5 c generlly, Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utlity, ald Fairness: Comments on die
EthicaldlFbundauionsol"Just Compensaion" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (asserting that
compensation is seldom constitutionally required but fairness to adversely affected landowners
calls for compensation to avoid substantial demoralization losses). ProfessorJoseph L. Sax also
has written about the role of tiiess in takings jurisprndence. ,5eeJoseph L. Sax, Land Ue
Regulation: 7imc to 7link about irness, 50 NAr. RFSOURCFS.J. 455 (2010).
211. See Michelman, supr- note 212, at 1214-24.
212. Also, c., Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underljinglrinciples,
78 CALIF. L. REv. 53, 89 n. 164 (1990) (exploring in Part II, "Takings as Intentional Deprivations
of Property Without Moral Justilication").
213. See Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 434, 437 (2001).
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control.
A second-level adjustment of the immunity doctrine is to permit tort liability
when the flood control dam operator is guilty of gross negligence. Even in flood
control there is no justification, nor any need to immunize losses caused by the
damn operator's gross negligence. An agency entrusted with public safety from
possible floods should never be allowed to act heedlessly and in wanton and
willful disregard for the safety of those whom it must protect. Congress is
currently considering that exact form of legislation.!4 There is no chilling effect
on management decisions by holding dana operators to what will be, in effect, a
rational-basis-under-the-circumstances review. The fact that there may be a gray
area at the borderline between negligence and gross negligence should spur
greater planning and public participation in federal floodwater management
operations. Like the first-level incursion on tort immunity however, revoking
immunity for gross negligence is a salutary development and worth the
investment in improved decision-making. The change may even contribute to
the perceived fairness of the release plan chosen by the dam manager, but it
remains incomplete because it still fails to reach cases where either a reasonable
decision or flawed (but not reckless) decision about dam operations inflicts a
substantial and disproportionate loss on a downstream landowner.
B. COST INTERNALIzATION THROUGH FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICTs
Policy makers need to find a broader method of providing compensation
to "losers." Once smaller losses are put to one side,"1 ' other compensation
options for serious flood-induced losses, which could have been avoided by
different dam operations choices, are possible. Few are attractive though.
Commercial flood insurance is an option, but it is costly and requires sufficient
foresight and solvency on the part of landowners to make the purchase.
Federally subsidized flood insurance is politically unpopular, encourages
imprudent building in the floodplain, and even that subsidy does not result in
universal coverage.
A more appealing remedial option is to establish flood control districts that
create compensation funds available to redress substantial flood losses. These
districts would obtain funding by laying a small ad valorem tax on all parcels in
the district. The compensation fund could be tapped according to criteria set
by the district, presumably including a threshold in terms of severity of loss. A
flood control district approach is, essentially, an insurance system that obtains
universal participation, thereby spreading the cost coextensively with the risk.
A flood control district operates less expensively than a commercial insurance
option because no profits are extracted," ' the tax collection is very efficient, and
there is universal participation, which tends to lower overall rates. All members

214. See Army Corps Accountability Act of 2013, H.R. 1662, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
215. The text limits its discussion of compensation to losses that are substantial. Trivial losses
should not be compensable under the doctrine of de minimis non cumt lex. Small losses may
have to be borne by those on whom they [all because the transaction costs that would attach to
providing a remedy are too great in proportion to the loss they assuage.
216. Additional economics can be obtained by using alternative dispute resolution methods
to process claims that are not settled on a mutually agreeable basis under the compensation rules
that can be drawn to minimize the grounds for claims and disputes.
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of the district share in the benefits-both the protection afforded by tie dani's
operation and access to remedial payments from the fund for qualifying losses.
Using flood control districts to afford compensation for losses in the
manner advocated here finds support in a portion of the law and economics
literature that coined the terrn "givings." Under that analysis, a giving occurs
anytime a government regulation or action bestows a benefit upon a private

property owner."'7 The sane regulation or action that creates a giving
concurrently may impose a burden upon other private property owners because
government regulations and actions that affect property often distribute both
benefits and burdens to achieve a goal. ' As a matter of economic principle,
"Takings, when uncompensated, generate negative externalities; givings, when
unaccounted for, generate positive externalities. From an economic standpoint,
neither type of externality should remain outside the state's calculuLs." ' Using
Miller v. Schoene as an example, Abraamn Bell and Gideon Parchomsovsky
suggest compensation should issue from those who receive the uninternalized
benefit:
The "public use" requirement of the Takings Clause makes derivative
givings likely companions of physical takings. In Miller v. Schoene, the state

ordered the destruction of cedar trees on Miller's lot in order to prevent the
spread of a fungus to nearby apple tree lots. Miller suflered a physical taking without compensation - while his neighbors received a derivative giving.
However, the Court closed its eyes to the givings half of the picture and
determined that, as a result of the public benefit, no compensable taking had
taken place. A better result would have been similar to that of Boomer Iv.
Atlantic Cement CoI, absent the valuation problems: The apple tree farmers
should have been charged for the benefit to their properties, and Miller should
have received compensation.' °
Translating that suggestion from the Miller v. Schoene context to the flood
control context, utilizing flood control districts to provide compensation
promotes internalization of both costs and benefits. Even if some losses remain
in place based on thresholds of harm, the largest and most disproportionate
losses will be reduced 2 ' or eliminated and paid for by the beneficiaries of the
flood protection "giving." From a broader public perspective, flood control
district compensation does this by reclaiming a portion of the "giving" that the
dan provided in flood protection to all of the downistream landowners and
using it to compensate those disproportionately disadvantaged by the manner
in which the dam operator chooses to release the stored potential flood water.
Taking the justification for taxing district residents a step further; in many basins
the need for protection is related not only to the fact that the landowners are
located in a flood-prone area, the severity of flooding and the flood threat is
often exacerbated by the activities of those same landowners that "harden" the
217. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomsovsky, GivingN, 111 YALE Lj. 547, 554 (2001).
218. Id.
219. Id. (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Thcoty ofP'roperyRights, 57 AM. EcON. REV.
347, 347-57 (1967) (arguing that property rights arise to effect internalization of externalities,
both positive and negative).

220.

Id.at572.

221. The compensation formula could be less than 100% of the loss (akin to a co-pay), or have
diflering percentages of compensation as the total anount of die loss increased.
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flood plain or impede the natural drainage and flood absorption capacity of the
basin. " Thus, in the end, the cost of building the dam, which includes
purchasing reservoir storage space and the cost of managing the dam remains
on the public and is funded by Congress or in accord with its legislated dictates.
Other operations-imposed losses, which downstream landowners suffer and
deserve redress for, are compensated by those who received the giving.
V. CONCLUSION
The injuries caused in the service of flood control will continue to increase.
Flood control has long been a vital governmental function and the desire for
greater protection in an era of increased weather variability will only increase
pressure on dam operators to minimize major harms. Public sentiment on this
subject is similar to that of the average citizen in the previously mentioned
garbage pick-up and disposal context-everyone wants the water impounded to
prevent the major flood, but no one wants the water released in ways that
disadvantage their downstream parcels. Congress, some eighty years ago, began
putting in place major physical engineering projects, including the Clearwater
Dam, with the intent that those dams would operate to protect against, or at
least mitigate, harms resulting from major floods. Inevitably as the areas below
those dams become more populated, or as the drainage patterns change, or as
the loss of stationarity alters the frequency and severity of flood events, it is
imperative that flood control dam operators can act to maximize public
protection with those dams. The choices for the management, including both
impoundment and release of potential flood waters, frequently will involve
forms of triage that require choosing among harms that may be suffered by
those downstream of the dam.
Congress has chosen to ensure dam operator freedom of action by granting
tort immunity. The Supreme Court has cabined that immunity in the sphere
where it is needed, protecting federal dam operators from liability related to
actions affecting flood risks. The Supreme Court, also has recognized that tort
immunity prompts adversely affected parties to seek remedies through Fifth
Amendment takings claims. The Court specifically iidicated that such cases
must first cross a high foreseeability threshold that allows them to be considered
under takings law, and not tort law, and even then requires those cases to satisfy
usual regulatory takings tests to succeed. On several fronts, the eventual

222. United States Geological Survey, The Water Cycle: Surface Runoff,http://ga.water.usgs.
gov /edu/watercyclerunoff.html (last visited October 2, 2015):

As more and more people inhabit the Earth, and as more development and
urbanization occur, more of the natural landscape is replaced by impervious surfaces,
such as roads, houses, parking lots, and buildings that reduce infiltration of water into
the ground and accelerate nmoff to ditches and streams. In addition to increasing
imperviousness, removal of vegetation and soil, grading the land surface, and
constructing drainage networks increase runoff volumes and shorten runoff time into
streams from rainfall and snowmelL As a result, the peak discharge, volume, and
frequency of floods increase in nearby streams.

See also Brian Clark Howard, Amid Drough4 ExplainingColorado'sExtreme Bloods, NAT.
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 14, 2013), available at http://news.nafionalgeographic.con/news/2013
/09/130913-colorado-flood-houlder-climate-change-drought-fires/.
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decision of the Federal Circuit finding a taking, in AG&FCappears to violate
those warnings and proscriptions. There can be little doubt that the
Commission suffered a disproportionate loss at the hands of the Corps' possibly
flawed decision. That loss, under those circumstalces, bespeaks great
unfairness, but not necessarily a government taking of property.
The aphorism, "Hard cases make bad law," is at work here. It is unfair to
leave the Management Area's loss of hardwood forest resource solely on the
Commission. Even so, on a record not circumscribed by poor litigation choices
of the Corps, proper application of takings law, coupled with the Corps' tort
immunity, in this case would require the courts to deny compensation. That
unhappy result is not a warrant for improperly applying existing takings law to
create an untenable precedent that makes federal darn operators virtual insurers
of major downstream losses occasioned by their operational flood control
decisions. The preferable path is to ensure that adversely affected landowners
receive fair treatment and compensation by creating flood control districts
empowered to collect taxes from "all beneficiaries of the dan, and use those
funds to redress unfair and disproportionate losses incurred as a result of the
flood control choices made by the damn operator.
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